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standpoints of tax justice, production of revenue, and tax admin-
istration. 6 Pending such a study, judgment concerning the best
manner of dealing with the matter should be reserved.7
ALVIN B. RUBIN
THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS
Although legal means have long been available to protect
the form in which many ideas are embodied, the ideas themselves
have remained unprotected almost until the present. Formerly,
however, there was scant need for protection. In addition, the
difficulties of administration of such protection made the courts
reluctant to assume the task.
During a period when the majority of ideas for business use
were those relating to mechanical improvements in the method
of production and usually were supplied by the master or his
servants for use in the business, patent' and trade secret2 law
36. In this connection see the arguments for the taxation of certain
intangible interests made in Welch, The Exemption of Intangibles from
Property Taxes, Tax Exemptions (1939) 155. And see Hughes, Tax Exemp-
tions (1935) 13 Tenn. L. Rev. 79, 87; Stimson, Exemption of Property from
Taxation in California (1932) 21 Calif. L. Rev. 193, 218.
37. Consideration of the problem elsewhere has led to various conclu-
sions. Some states have classified intangibles separately from other prop-
erty and tax them at a lower rate. See, for example, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1933) § 64-901 et seq.; N.C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1939) § 7880(156),, et seq. It
has been suggested that they should be completely exempted, the loss of
revenue and injustice to the payers of property taxes to be offset by ade-
quate provisions in the general income tax law. See Twentieth Century
Fund, Committee on Taxation, Facing the Tax Problem (1937) 432; Michigan
Tax Study Commission, Report of the Tax Study Commission (1939) 37. Four
states have levied a special income tax, measured only by income from in-
tangibles. Ibid.
1. Rev. Stat. § 4886 (1874), as last amended by 53 Stat. 1212 (1939), 35
U.S.C.A. § 31 (1940) allows issuance of a patent for a new and useful ma-
chine, process, art or improvement thereof.
2. Former employees were enjoined from revealing trade secrets in Pea-
body v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 96 Am. Dec. 664 (1868); 0. & W. Thum Co. v.
Tlocznski, 114 Mich. 149, 72 N.W. 140, 38 L.R.A. 200 (1897); Stone v. Goss, 65
N.J. Eq. 756, 55 Atl. 736, 63 L.R.A. 344 (1903). See Vulcan Detinning Co. v.
Assman, 185 App. Div. 399, 173 N.Y. Supp. 334 (1918). Compare Silver Spring
Bleaching & Dyeing Co. v. Woolworth, 16 R.I. 729, 19 Atl. 528 (1890) where
a formerly employed inventor was compelled to reveal to his former em-
ployer a trade secret discovered while he was in plaintiff's service.
Use of a trade secret by one who knew of the employee's breach of con-
fidence will be enjoined. Westervelt v. National Paper & Supply Co., 154 Ind.
673, 57 N.E. 552 (1900); Aronson v. Orlov, 228 Mass. 1, 116 N.E. 951 (1917);
Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889); Eastman Co. v. Reichen-
bach, 65 Hun 620, 20 N.Y. Supp. 110 (1892); Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v.
Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86 At. 688 (1913). Accounting of profits from use of
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furnished adequate protection. Similarly before the growth of
the radio and motion picture industries, literary productions
were sufficiently protected by the law of copyright and literary
property.'
The development of our present complex mercantile system
brought with it the need for many new types of ideas. Large
businesses needed advertising schemes, plans for expanding sales,
reducing costs, increasing revenue. New styles became an im-
portant factor in merchandising.5 Many new industries required
particular kinds of ideas. Radio and motion pictures needed ideas
for programs that would appeal to the public as well as novel
ways of presenting them. Ideas for programs became valuable
apart from the form in which the ideas were expressed."
These new types of ideas could not be protected by the es-
tablished legal remedies. Patent law7 protected new machines,
processes, or arts, but it did not extend to methods of doing busi-
ness,8 or mere ideas for inventions.9 Trade secret law protected
the secrets of a business from dishonest discovery i ° by another
trade secret was directed in Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 75
N.J. Eq. 542, 73 Atl. 603 (1909); 80 N.J. Eq. 443, 85 Atl. 318 (1912). See Nims,
The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade Marks (3 ed. 1936) 425, § 154.
3. 35 Stat. 1075 et seq. (1909), 17 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. (1927).
4. See, for examples of application of the literary property concept, Fer-
ris v. Froham, 223 U.S. 424, 32 S.Ct. 263, 56 L.Ed. 492 (1912); Werckmeister v.
American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321, 68 L.R.A. 591 (C.C.A. 2d, 1904);
Thompson v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 3 F. (2d) 707 (N.D. Ga. 1925);
New Jersey State Dental Soc. v. Dentacura Co., 57 N.J. Eq. 593, 41 Atl. 672
(1898); Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 7 Am. Rep. 480 (1870).
5. Problems of protecting fashion designs are not discussed in this ar-
ticle. A protective boycott by style creators to prevent style pirating of
published styles is deemed a combination in restraint of trade. Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 703, 85 L.Ed.
557 (1941); Millinery Creators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S.
469, 61 S.Ct. 708, 85 L.Ed. 562 (1941). However styles will be protected until
they have been "published." Margolis v. National Bellas Hess Co., Inc., 139
Misc. 738, 249 N.Y. Supp. 175 (1931). For discussion of defensive boycott see
excellent Comment (1941) 35 Ill. L. Rev. 546. See also Notes (1940) 20 B. U. L.
Rev. 365, (1940) 26 Va. L. Rev. 828, (1940) 49 Yale L, J. 1290.
6. See Cole v. Phillips H. Lord, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 404, 406 (App. Div. 1941).
7. See supra note 1.
8. Fowler v. New York, 121 Fed. 747 (C.C.A. 2d, 1903) (bitransit subway
not patentable); Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 87 C.C.A. 451,
160 Fed. 467, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 665 (C.C.A. 2d, 1908) (system for checking res-
taurant receipts not patentable).
9. Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U.S. 480, 489, 11 S.Ct.
846, 849, 35 L.Ed. 521, 525 (1891): "It is evident the invention was not com-
pleted until the construction of the machine. A conception of the mind is
not an invention until represented in some physical form, and unsuccessful
experiments or projects, abandoned by the inventor, are equally destitute of
that character."
10. See note 2, supra.
120 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. IV
only so long as the information remained undisclosed." If a per-
son revealed an idea in attempting to sell it, all secrecy was con-
sidered to be lost.'2 The law of copyright protected only the form
and style in which the ideas were expressed; not the ideas them-
selves.' Similarly the law of literary property assured the author
of a literary production only against its unauthorized use or pub-
lication; 4 the protection did not extend to the ideas expressed. 5
Once an idea became generally known, policy considerations
favoring free and unrestrained circulation of ideas prevented
protection except in the case of patent or copyright infringement
or passing-off cases where the public had been confused. 16 Since
11. Covell v. Chadwick, 153 Mass. 263, 26 N.E. 856 (1891) (one who sells
a trade secret is free to use his knowledge of it for his own benefit); Hamil-
ton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 Fed. 401 (W.D. Mich. 1908) (a trade secret
will not be protected where there has not been a sufficient effort to conceal
it). See Nims, op. cit. supra note 2, at 411, § 148.
The argument has been advanced that there is no reasonable distinction
between an original unpublished idea and a trade secret. See Note (1936) 21
Corn. L. Q. 486, 488. A distinction was made in Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N.J. Eq.
575, 580, 64 Atl. 436, 438 (1906) on the ground that a concurrence of several
minds was required before an idea could become effective, while a trade
secret or patented invention was capable of embodiment at the will of the
creator alone, But see Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co. of America, Inc., 56 F.
(2d) 963 (C.C.A. 7th, 1932) where an accounting of profits was ordered for
use of an idea inequitably appropriated in violation of an agreement that
ideas should remain the secret of the plaintiff until he was paid.
12. Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E. 506
(1892); Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N.J. Eq. 575, 64 Atl. 436 (1906). See Leuddecke v.
Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F. (2d) 345, 347 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934). Compare Booth
v. Stutz Motor Car Co. of America, Inc., 56 F. (2d) 962 (C.C.A. 7th, 1932)
which might be harmonized by finding an express agreement to guard the
disclosure.
13. Bunell v. Chown, 69 Fed. 993 (N.D. Ohio, 1895); Eichel v. Marcin, 241
Fed. 404 (S.D. N.Y. 1913); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F. (2d) 145
(S.D. N.Y. 1929), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902, 51 S.Ct. 216, 75 L.Ed. 795 (1930).
14. Cases cited in note 4, supra.
15. The accepted view that literary property rights in an unpublished
manuscript are no broader than copyright protection for a published work
was the basis of the decision in Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 287, 171
N.E. 56, 58 (1930): "There may be literary property in a particular com-
bination of ideas or in the form in which ideas are embodied. There can be
none in ideas."
English cases on literary property protection took the position that ideas
were incapable of ownership.See Justice Yates' dissenting opinion to Millar
v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2366, 98 Eng. Reprint 201, 205 (K.B. 1769).
16. In International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S.Ct.
68, 63 L.Ed. 211 (1918), the court enjoined International News Service from
copying news collected by their competitor so long as its news value re-
mained. The decision indicated that thereafter a competitor would be en-
joined from systematically appropriating the published ideas of a competitor.
In Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. (2d) 279 (C.C.A. 2d, 1929), cert.
denied 281 U.S. 728, 50 S.Ct. 245, 74 L.Ed. 1145 (1930), a case involving an
application for injunction to prevent copying original designs, the rule of
the Associated Press case was limited to news appropriation. Learned Hand,
J., referring to the latter case, said: "While it is of course true that law
ordinarily speaks in general terms, there are cases where the occasion is at
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the principal value of many innovations lay in their novelty, the
business that first used such ideas exhausted the greater part of
their value before they became available to others.
The need for new forms of protection was most acutely felt
in the field of advertising, where the advertising agent's stock in
trade consisted of original ideas which, once used, lost all right
to protection. So long as advertising ideas were supplied by per-
sons or firms employed for that purpose, there was little difficulty.
The services were taken as consideration for the wages. But
when strangers began to suggest ideas for which they requested
compensation a more perplexing problem was presented. Justice
would seem to require that a business which made use of the
valuable product should be forced to pay for it. But a real prob-
lem lurked in the administration of the new type of "property."
ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES
If a court is to allow a recovery for the use of an idea, it
must place a value upon it. How much is an idea worth? What
part of the success in using the idea is attributable to the ex-
penditure of capital, the risk undertaken, and the proper execu-
tion? What if the net result indicates that the use of the idea did
not justify the expense?17
once the justification for, and the limit of, what is decided. This appears to
us such an Instance; we think no more was covered than situations substan-
tially similar to those then at bar." 35 F. (2d) at 280.
Other decisions have' attempted to prevent competitors from taking a
free ride at the expense of another even in the absence of passing-off. In
Fonotipia v. Bradley, 171 Fed. 951 (E.D. N.Y. 1909) the defendant was en-
joined from making duplicates of plaintiff's phonograph records. In Meyer
v. Hurwitz, 5 F. (2d) 370 (E.D. Pa. 1925), the defendant was enjoined from
selling post cards to fit plaintiff's vending machines.
In Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133, 19 A.L.R. 937 (1921), the
defendant was enjoined from using the comic characters Mutt and Jeff
drawn by another cartoonist on the ground that the plaintiff was associated
with the comic characters in the public mind. Compare New York Herald
Co. v. Star Co., 146 Fed. 204 (S.D. N.Y. 1906), affirmed without opinion, 76
C.C.A. 678, 146 Fed. 1023 (1906); Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith, 122 C.C.A.
568, 204 Fed. 398 (1913), appeal dismissed 231 U.S. 348, 58 L.Ed. 262, 34 S.Ct.
73 (1913).
In Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Sta., Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631
(1937), an injunction was granted to prevent the defendant from broadcast-
ing phonograph recordings where the records were marked, "not leased for
radio broadcast." Contra: RCA Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman, 114 F. (2d) 86
(C.C.A. 2d, 1940), cert. denied 311 U.S. 712, 61 S.Ct. 393, 85 L.Ed. 280 (1940).
For an argument that the doctrine of unfair competition should be extended
to prevent inequitable appropriation of the product of another's work and
effort, see Callman, Copyright and Unfair Competition (1940) 2 LOUISIANA
LAW REvIEw 648.
17. See Stone v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 260 App. Div. 450, 23 N.Y.
S. (2d) 210, 212 (1940): "It is familiar law that owing to the difficulties of
enforcing such rights, the courts have uniformly refused to protect property
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Before protection can be administered an appropriation of
the idea must be shown. In many cases ideas are not used in the
exact form in which they are offered. In addition, if the idea is
one of the same general sort that is in current use, or if the de-
fendant might reasonably have conceived of it, it is difficult to
find an appropriation. 8
Additional problems arise where ideas are submitted pre-
maturely, before they are practicable, and are used years later
when changed circumstances warrant. X's idea of utilizing com-
mercial airline radio sets for the transmission of personal mes-
sages of passengers, is rejected in 1930 because the volume of
business does not justify the service. In 1945 increased traffic and
technical improvements in radio transmission induce the institu-
tion of the service. Is X entitled to compensation for his idea? 9
How is the court to distinguish between ideas that are worthy
of legal protection and others that are not? The slogan "Goody
Candy is Good" is neither original nor clever. But a slogan for
a cleansing powder, "Hasn't Scratched Yet," accompanied by a
picture of a new-born chick would seem ingenious enough to
entitle its creator to remuneration. What distinction, capable of
consistent application, can be drawn between the two situations?
Leaving these difficulties with a jury is a possible solution.
But juries in this type of case tend to be plaintiff-minded; usually
the judge will be better acquainted with the problems involved.
CONTRACT CASES
Problems of administration are minimized where the parties
have agreed upon a price to be paid for an idea before it is re-
vealed. In such a case the parties by contract fix the price of the
in ideas that have not been reduced to concrete form." See also Comment
(1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1427.
18. If there is a reasonable amount of difference in two plans the courts
will usually hold that the plaintiff's idea was not used. See Ketcham v. New
York World's Fair 1939, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. N.Y. 1940). See also
Larkin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 125 Misc. 238, 210 N.Y. Supp. 374 (1925), affirmed
216 App. Div. 832, 215 N.Y. Supp. 875 (1926), affirmed without opinion 245 N.Y.
578, 157 N.E. 864 (1927); Rodriguez v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 259 App.
Div. 224, 18 N.Y. S. (2d) 759 (1940), affirmed 34 N.E. (2d) 375 (N.Y. 1941); In-
dustrial Savings Corp. v. Morris Plan Co., 234 Fed. 382 (S.D. N.Y. 1916). See
Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F. (2d) 685 (C.C.A. 2d, 1930), where the plaintiff
was unable to prove that a similar idea had not come from employees of
defendant. This case has been criticized in Note (1929) 7 N.C. L. Rev. 318.
19. Recovery was denied on other grounds without discussion of pre-
maturity of the idea in Rodriguez v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 259 App.
Div. 244, 18 N.Y. S. (2d) 759 (1940), affirmed 34 N.E. (2d) 375 (N.Y. 1941),
involving an idea for ship-to-shore radio communication.
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idea. It should be unnecessary to examine the nature of the idea,
for the purchaser has assumed the risk that he may pay more
than the idea is worth. It is as though the parties were trading
horses sight unseen. However, the courts have gone into exam-
ination of the character of the idea even in contract cases. In
Masline v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad20 the de-
fendant agreed to pay five per cent of the net profit resulting
from the use of valuable information which the plaintiff war-
ranted would increase net revenue by at least $100,000 annually.
The plaintiff then advised the defendant to sell advertising space
on its right of ways, cars, and stations. Although use of the idea
increased revenues even beyond expectations, the defendant re-
fused to pay. The court justified the defendant's refusal on the
theory of an implied condition of originality in idea contracts.
Judicial notice was taken of the fact that somewhat similar
schemes had been used elsewhere. This generally accepted case'
seems inconsistent with elementary contract principles. Plaintiff
represented merely that use of his information would increase
profits more than $100,000 annually. He did not warrant original-
ity. An idea worth $100,000 should furnish as much consideration
as a peppercorn, or even a horse, a hawk, or a robe. Although a
shrewd business man would seldom agree to pay for something
before he knows what he is to receive, when a person shows him-
self willing to take the chance, he should not be permitted to
obtain the benefits of the information without paying for it. More
recent cases indicate a tendency to depart from the rule of the
Masline case.2 2
20. 95 Conn. 702, 112 Atl. 639 (1921), criticized in Note (1921) 19 Mich. L.
Rev. 874, 875.
21. Accord: Soule v. Bon Amt Co., 201 App. Div. 794, 195 N.Y. Supp. 574
(1922), affirmed on other grounds 253 N.Y. 609, 139 N.E. 754 (1923); Burwell
v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 31 Ohio App. 22, 164 N.E. 434 (1928). Compare
Williston, The Law of Contracts (2 ed. 1936) 391, § 115: "However an idea
lacking in novelty and originality and universally known, whether or not
technically sufficient to serve as consideration, will not readily be regarded
as requested by a promisor as the consideration for his promise." See also
Lueddeche v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F. (2d) 345, 348 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934).
22. Elfenbein v. Luckenback Terminals, 111 N.J. Law 67, 166 Atl. 91
(1933), discussed in Note (1933) 67 U.S. L. Rev. 595. See opinion by Judge
Learned Hand In Taylor v. Burr Printing Co., 26 F. (2d) 331, 332-333 (C.C.A.
2d, 1928): "We cannot agree with the learned judge in substituting for the
judgment of the defendant his own estimate of the value of the plan. ...
These men were not children, but seasoned In their business, and, if they
chose to enter into an improvident contract, any resulting loss is as much
to the account of their principal as in any other case."
The present tendency Is to require idea-men to sign contracts giving the
agency the power of determining the originality of the Idea. See Comment
(1939) 10 Air L. Rev. 408.
1941]
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IDEAS WITHOUT BENEFIT OF CONTRACT
In early cases, the courts protected ideas only where an ex-
press contract for them had been made prior to disclosure.23
Pressed by the needs of the times, the courts have begun to seek
a practicable method of protecting ideas not expressly contracted
for, by means of an implied contract. An effort has been made to
establish a working rule by creating a distinction between an
idea that is "concrete" and therefore protectable in the absence
of contract, and one that is "abstract," and hence protected only
under the terms of an express contract.
The "concrete" idea distinction was first expressed in Liggett
& Myers Company v. Meyers,2 4 a case involving a suggestion for
a billboard advertisement for cigarettes. It was held that adoption
of a plaintiff's suggestion entitled him to recover on the basis of
an implied contract to pay for property used. The Indiana court
of appeals stated that the idea had taken on a concrete form. In
Ryan v. Century Brewing Association2- the plaintiff, on invitation,
suggested the slogan "The Beer of the Century." Recovery on a
quantum meruit basis was again allowed, this time for services.
The Washington court followed the previous Meyers case, adding
that it made no difference whether the suit were brought for the
value of the services or the idea since both amounted to the same
thing.26
The Meyers27 and the Ryan2 1 cases both indicate that the test
of a "concrete" idea is whether it has been reduced to the form in
23. Universal Savings Corp. v. Morris Plan Co., 234 Fed. 382 (S.D. N.Y.
1916); Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E. 506
(1892); Haskins v. Ryan, 75 N.J. Eq. 330, 78 AtI. 566 (1908); Stein v. Morris,
120 Va. 390, 91 S.E. 177 (1917); -Anderson v. Distler, 173 Misc. 261, 17 N.Y. S.
(2d) 674 (1940). Recovery allowed under terms of contract in Shapiro v.
,/Press Publishing Co., 235 App. Div. 689, 255 N.Y. Supp. 899 (1932).
24. 101 Ind. App. 240, 194 N.E. 206, 210 (1935). "While we recognize that
an abstract idea as such may not be the subject of a property right, yet,
when it takes upon itself the concrete form which we find in the instant
case, It Is our opinion that it then becomes a property right subject to sale."
Notes (1935) 15 B.U. L. Rev. 633, ('1936) 21 Corn. L. Q. 486, (1935) 44 Yale
L. J. 1269.
25. 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. (2d) 1053 (1936), noted in (1936) 36 Col. L. Rev.
1375.
26. 185 Wash. at 604, 55 P. (2d) at 1054: "So far as appellant is concerned,
we see no difference between a suit such as this for services rendered and
a suit based upon the originator's property right in his own idea."
27. 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N.E. 206 (1935).
28. 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. (2d) 1053 (1936). Compare Healey v. R. H. Macy
& Co., 251 App. Div. 440, 297 N.Y. Supp. 165 (1937), affirmed 277 N.Y. 681, 14
N.E. (2d) 388 (1938), where recovery was allowed for the reasonable value
of Christmas slogans on the basis of quasi contract. The "concrete" idea
distinction was not mentioned.
[Vol. IV
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which it is to be used. Thb idea must be something more than an
indefinite hint. No exceptional ability was required for the con-
ception of the idea involved in either suit. The elements that
were present in both cases, and probably influenced the courts,
were (1) the relative ease of determining whether a slogan or
slogan-like advertisement has been used, (2) the fact that ad-
vertisers are accustomed to paying for such ideas, and (3) the
fact that a fairly standard price for such ideas has been estab-
lished by advertising agencies. Due to these factors, slogan cases
lend themselves to equitable as well as relatively simple admin-
istration. There is a firm basis for implying a contract and a
fairly accurate criterion for making an estimation of value.29
Nevertheless if a contract is to be implied: (1) the idea must be
original; (2) the idea must not have been freely circulated by
the creator; (3) it must have been submitted in expectation of
remuneration. 0
The "concrete" idea distinction has not been applied to other
types of ideas in the same manner that it has been applied to
slogans. In New York, where most of the late cases on the sub-
ject have arisen, the courts have recognized the "concrete" idea
distinction,3 but they seem to require more than merely an ori-
ginal idea reduced to definite form. An idea for advertising a
railroad at the world's fair by means of a miniature railroad was
held to be abstract. 2 Other ideas that were not considered suffici-
/29. In Liggett & Myers v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N.E. 206 (1935),
plaintiff suggested a fee of ten per cent of the gross cost of advertising
which would have amounted to approximately $25,000. The court awarded
$9,000.
,/In Ryan v. Century Brewing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. (2d) 1053 (1936),
a recovery of $7,500 was allowed. In Healey v. R. H. Macy & Co., 251 App.
Div. 440, 297 N.Y. Supp. 165 (1937), $2,500 was allowed for Christmas slogans.
These recoveries indicate that the volume of advertising and the period for
which it is used will be substantial factors in the quantum of recovery.
Compare Cole v. Phillips H. Lord, 28 N.Y. S. (2d) 404, 410 (App. Div. 1941),
where the court held that the jury might use contractual terms discussed
by the parties as a "yardstick" for assessing damages on a quantum meruit
basis. See also Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 56 F. (2d) 962, 969 (C.C.A. 7th,
1932).
30. For analysis of necessary limitations on protection of concrete Ideas
seevComment (1939) 10 Air L. Rev. 394, 408. In this connection see also Logan,
VLegal Protection of Ideas (1939) 4 Mo. L. Rev. 239, 255-264.
31. Lip service was paid to the "concrete" idea distinction In Rodriguez
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 259 App. Div. 224, 18 N.Y. S. (2d) 759 (1940),
affirmed 34 N.E. (2d) 375 (N.Y. 1941); Williamson v. New York Central R.
R., 258 App. Div. 226, 16 N.Y. S. (2d) 217 (1939); Stone v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 260 App. Div. 450, 23 N.Y. S. (2d) 210 (1940); Alberts v. Reming-
ton Rand, Inc., 175 Misc. 486, 23 N.Y. S. (2d) 892 (1940).
32. Williamson v. New York Central R.R., 258 App. Div. 226, 16 N.Y. S.
(2d) 217 (1939).
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ently concrete included an idea for demonstrating the use of an
electric shaver by a chart showing directions in which hair grows
on the face,38 an idea for ship-to-shore radio form communica-
tions, 4 and a skit for advertising cigarettes by radio or motion
pictures.3 5 Such cases obviously do not turn on the question of
whether or not the idea has been reduced to its ultimate form.
In the electric shaver case, 6 for example, a chart would not have
demonstrated the idea more accurately than the written explana-
tion. The court seems to be influenced by the nature of the idea
itself and the amount of work and effort required to develop it
into a valuable form. Thus a formula for a radio fiction was held
to embody a sufficiently original idea to form a right separate
and apart from the script itself .8 In Ketcham v. New York
World's Fair 1939,18 the court stated, by way of dictum, that a
thoroughly worked out plan for the color schemes of the World's
Fair could be protected as literary property." If there had merely
been an idea to paint the building the colors of the rainbow, the
court would probably have considered the idea unworthy of pro-
tection in the absence of an express contract.40 When the creator
of the idea develops it into an attractive, harmonious scheme, the
situation is altered. The distinction is due both to the effort re-
-33. Alberts v. Remington Rand, Inc., 175 Misc. 486, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 892
(1940).
/34. Rodriguez v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 259 App. Div. 224, 18 N.Y.
S. (2d) 759 (1940), affirmed 34 N.E. (2d) 375 (N.Y. 1941).
7 35. Stone v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 260 App. Div. 450, 23 N.Y. S.
(2d) 210 (1940).
36. Alberts v. Remington Rand, Inc., 175 Misc. 486, 23 N.Y. S. (2d) 892
(1940).
-37. Cole v. Phillips H. Lord, Inc., 28 N.Y. S. (2d) 404 (App. Div. 1941),
the court found sufficient facts that the jury might find an express contract
or an implied contract based on the relationship of trust and confidence.
738. 34 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. N.Y. 1940).
39. Insofar as the Kefcham case, 34 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. N.Y. 1940), indi-
cates that literary property protection extends to the ideas themselves, it is
subject to criticism.
Under the rule of Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82
L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938), the federal courts should follow the com-
mon law decisions of the state courts. Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 171
N.E. 56 (1930), should have been controlling on that point. If the resemblance
of plans had been so close to to amount to an infringement or copying of
the chart rather than a mere taking of an idea, literary property protection
would have been a proper remedy. Nevertheless the idea should have been
considered "concrete" and capable of protection as an idea. In this connec-
tion see Comment (1939) 73 U.S. L. Rev. 4, discussing a compromise of a
claim of the alleged creator of an idea for the theme-center of trylon and
perisphere for the New York World's Fair.
40. The Ketcham case, 84 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. N.Y. 1940), was distinguished
from cases involving abstract ideas on this basis in Alberts v. Remington
Rand, 175 Misc. 486, 23 N.Y. S. (2d) 892 (1940).
COMMENTS
quired to reduce an idea to a form in which it can be used and
the fact that only in such shape can its value be appreciated."'
The degree of novelty promises to play an increasingly im-
portant part in the cases, although it may seldom be discussed.
When a decision is based on this factor, the use of the description
"concrete" as the basis for the distinction is misleading. In this
connection the "concrete" idea distinction may be merely a legal
device by which the court reserves to itself the determination of
a question of fact. Thus an extremely ingenious idea will prob-
ably be regarded by the court as "concrete" while another not
so brilliant will be regarded as abstract although the latter may
have been reduced to a more definite form.
CONCLUSION
All ideas should serve as consideration for express contracts.
In addition original ideas will be protected on the basis of quasi
contract whenever the courts feel that the circumstances justify
undertaking the difficulties of administration involved. Whether
protection will be extended will depend largely upon the degree
of novelty, the definiteness of the form and the amount of effort
expended in reducing the idea to a detailed form. Due to the
relative ease of administering them, slogans and slogan-like ad-
vertisements have been the first type of ideas to which the courts
,have accorded protection. The term "concrete" has been used to
designate those ideas whose administration the courts deem
feasible.
RUSSELL B. LONG
JOINDER OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES IN LOUISIANA
The problem of joinder of criminal offenses in Louisiana has
-struggled through an interesting cycle. Prior to the adoption of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, the general rule in Louisiana,
like that of the common law jurisdictions,' was that two or more
41. In Keller v. American Chain Co., 255 N.Y. 94, 174 N.E. 74 (1930), an
Idea for reducing freight rates by changing the classification of certain
goods was held to be sufficient consideration to support a contract, due to
the effort required to work out the new schedule. Judgment was for the de-
fendant, however, because of a pre-existing duty on the part of the plaintiff's
employer.
1. Johnson v. State, 29 Ala. 62, 65 Am. Dec. 383 (1856); Lascelles v. State,
90 Ga. 347, 35 Am. St. Rep. 216 (1892); State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 32 Am. Dec.
686 (1891); Porath v. State, 90 Wis. 527, 48 Am. St. Rep. 954 (1895). See Bell
1941]
